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HABEAS CORPUS-JURISDICTION-EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES AS PRE-
REQUISITE TO FEDERAL RELIEF-Petitioner, a prisoner of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania convicted of armed robbery in 1947, filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court after several efforts to secure 
the writ in a state court had been unsuccessful. Jurisdiction was based on 
exhaustion of available state remedies. The petition alleged that the Com-
monwealth had violated petitioner's rights under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment by denying him the right to be represented by 
counsel at his trial. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss on the ground 
that the petition on its face showed that state remedies had not been ex-
hausted. Following the hearing, held, writ granted. Since poverty prevented 
petitioner from ·paying the fees then considered mandatory for the filing of 
an appeal, he had sufficiently exhausted available state remedies. Failure of 
petitioner to be represented by counsel at his trial resulted in a denial of 
his constitutional rights. On petition for rehearing by the Commonwealth, 
held, denied. Even if, as now claimed by the Commonwealth, the filing fees 
were not mandatory, the case involved "exceptional circumstances" which 
allowed the court to issue the writ despite non-exhaustion of state remedies. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Gavell, (W.D. Pa. 1957) 157 F. Supp. 272. 
The power of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to state pris-
oners upon a determination that rights guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution have been violated is clearly established.1 The delicate nature 
of this power, the respect due state court judgments, and recognition of the 
equal duty of both federal and state courts to protect rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution combine to give rise to a presumption that the states have 
developed adequate methods of protecting these rights.2 Before a state 
prisoner can secure a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court he must 
show either that he has exhausted all appropriate state remedies, that 
there is an absence of available state corrective process, or that his case 
involves special circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect 
his rights.8 In the principal case the inability of petitioner to pay man-
datory filing fees for an appeal was a proper basis for determining at 
the original hearing that petitioner had exhausted all state remedies.4 
The difficult problem raised by the court's refusal to grant the Common-
wealth a rehearing, however, remains unresolved. The petition for re-
hearing asserted that the filing fees were not in fact mandatory and there-
lln re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890); '.Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). 
2 Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Mooney 
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
s Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). Rule codified in 28 U.S.C. (1952) §2254. 
4 United States v. Cummings, (2d Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 188; Dolan v. Alvis, (6th Cir. 
1951) 186 F. (2d) 586. See also 65 HARv. L. REv. 185 (1951). Contra, Willis v. Utecht, (8th 
Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 210. It may be assumed that the court was correct in determining 
that petitioner's constitutional rights had been violated. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938); Uveges v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948). 
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fore the prisoner did have an available state remedy. There is authority 
for the proposition that the availability of a state remedy can be asserted 
at any stage in the federal proceedings and if it is found that petitioner 
has not exhausted his state remedies the court must order him to do so 
before it can reconsider the merits of his petition.11 The court in the prin-
cipal case acknowledged that the Commonwealth was not estopped from 
raising this question6 but refused to grant the rehearing, holding that 
the case involved special or exceptional circumstances which established 
the requisite jurisdictional basis for issuance of the writ by a federal 
district court.7 It has been recognized that the term "exceptional cir-
cumstances" cannot be effectively defined and that the various factors 
present in each case must be appraised before a determination is made 
as to whether such circumstances are present.8 The decisions in which 
"exceptional circumstances" have been found to exist seem to be limited -
to two general situations: cases involving clear state interference with 
federal power,9 and cases in which it would be a gross violation of sub-
stantive justice to require the petitioner to follow through on state 
remedies before seeking federal relief.10 The clearest example of such a 
situation is where the petitioner is to be executed before he could properly 
utilize the available state remedies.11 The court in the principal case has in 
effect established a third category of "exceptional circumstances." Where 
there exists a seemingly apparent violation of the petitioner's consti-
tutional rights, a "good faith" attempt on his part to comply with the 
state remedies known to him will excuse the normal requirement of 
exhaustion of state remedies in the event a proper state remedy is sub-
sequently discovered to have been available. The factors relied on by the 
court in finding "exceptional circumstances" seem to indicate that it might 
11 United States v. Ragen, (7th Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 377; United States v. Ragen, 
(7th Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 379. In both cases a new remedy was created after a hearing 
in federal district court and the circuit court of appeals refused to examine the merits 
of the petitions on appeal until petitioners had availed themselves of the new state remedy. 
6 Principal case at 277. 
7 Principal case at 276. 
s Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). 
9 Ex parte Edwards, (S.D. Fla. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 673; Ex parte Jervey, (C.C. S.C. 1895) 
66 F. 957. Both cases involved state interference with the power to control interstate 
commerce. 
10 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination made fair determination 
of case by state courts impossible); Frisbie v. Collins, note 8 supra (state officers kidnapped 
petitioner and brought him back to the state where he was imprisoned); Brown v. Allen, 
344 U.S. 443 (1953) (petitioner prevented from utilizing available state remedies through 
interference by prison officials); Boyd v. O'Grady, (8th Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 146 (petition-
er's prison term would have expired before he could have secured a hearing in a state 
court); Bacorn v. Sullivan, (5th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 166 (petitioner unsuccessfully at-
tempted to get determination of his claims by state courts for four years and had not 
yet started to serve jail sentence); Dooly v. Mahoney, (E.D. Wash. 1942) 42 F. Supp. 890 
(petitioner given sentence clearly void on its face). 
11 Thomas v. Teets, (9th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 236. 
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have been unwilling to cause petitioner further hardship and delay.12 
Normally something more than hardship and delay must be found to 
establish special circumstances.13 It is clear that if the court had granted 
the rehearing and determined that petitioner did have an available state 
remedy it would not have been required to dismiss the petition absolutely. 
Instead it could have retained jurisdiction while granting a delay in issuing 
the writ, during which time petitioner would have been required to seek 
relief under the appropriate state remedy. I£ at the end of the delay 
granted petitioner could show that he was still unable to secure relief, 
the court could allow the writ to issue.14 Under this approach individual 
hardship and delay for petitioner would have been minimized while 
the overriding policy of allowing state courts at least one opportunity 
to pass on the merits of petitioner's claims would have been protected.15 
John D. Kelly, S.Ed. 
12 Petitioner's poverty, his low mental capacity and the difficulty the Commonwealth 
had in determining that there was an exception to the mandatory filing fee requirement 
were additional factors on which the court based its determination that the facts estab-
lished "exceptional circumstances." 
13 See, generally, Sweeny v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952); Dickson v. Castle, (9th Cir. 
1957) 244 F. (2d) 665; Ross v. Middlebrooks, (9th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 308. 
14 Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 (1950); Ex parte Sullivan, (D.C. Utah 1952) 107 
F. Supp. 514. 
15 See Beverly, "Federal-State Conflicts in the Field of Habeas Corpus," 41 CALIF. L. 
REV. 483 at 488 (1953). 
